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on the theory that race is a "suspect 
classification," such strikes are sub-
ject to "strict scrutiny." Id There-
fore, since gender is a "suspect clas-
sification" under Maryland law, the 
court permitted Batson's requirement 
of strict scrutiny to be extended to 
strikes based upon gender. Id 
Finally, in applying its analysis to 
the case at bar, the court concluded 
that the trial court had erred by deny-
ing defense counsel the opportunity to 
litigate the use of peremptory strikes 
on the basis of gender. Id at 270, 623 
A.2d at 653. The court also ruled that 
Darby v. Cisneros 
COURTS ARE NOT FREE TO 
REQUIRE EXHA USTION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
BEFORE SEEKING JUDICIAL 
REVIEW IF IT IS NOT MAN-
DATED BY EITHER THE 
ENABLING STATUTE OR 
AGENCY RULES. 
the prosecutor should not be permit-
ted to attempt to propound a gender-
neutral explanation in any later pro-
ceeding. This peremption is based on 
the fact that the prosecution freely 
admitted, in the first trial, to exercis-
ing peremptory challenges to exclude 
women from the jury. Id at 271,623 
A.2d at 653. The court remanded to 
the case to the circuit court for a new 
trial. 
In Tyler v. State, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland expanded the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Batson v. 
Kentucky. The court re-examined the 
The Supreme Court of the United 
States resolved a conflict between the 
judicially created doctrine of exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies and 
the statutory requirements of section 
lO(c) of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act ("APA") in Darby v. 
Cisneros, _ U.S. _, 113 S.Ct. 2539 
(1993). The Court held that when the 
AP A applies, courts are not free to 
require exhaustion as a rule of judicial 
administration where the agency ac-
tion has already become final under 
section I o( c). 
Petitioner, R. Gordon Darby 
("Darby") was a South Carolina real 
estate developer who developed and 
managed multi-family rental projects. 
Darby worked with a mortgage 
banker, Lonnie Garvin, who devel-
oped a plan to permit multi-family 
developers to obtain single-family 
mortgage insurance from the respon-
dent, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development ("HUD"). 
Garvin's plan allowed Darby to avoid 
HUD's "Rule of Seven" which pre-
vented rental properties from receiv-
ing single family mortgage insurance 
if the mortgagor already had financial 
interests in seven or more similar rental 
properties in the same project or sub-
division. 
Darby obtained the financing for 
three separate multi-unit projects and 
although he successfully rented the 
units, a combination of factors forced 
him to default. As a result, HUD 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Batson framework and found that 
under Articles 24 and 46 of the Mary-
land Declaration of Rights, the pros-
ecution cannot peremptorily challenge 
jurors on the basis of gender. Al-
though the decision strips the pros-
ecution of broad discretion in jury 
selection, it heightens the State's ac-
countability to the defendant. More-
over, it encourages both women and 
men to serve on juries by discourag-
ing the use of traditional stereotypes 
about female and male jurors. 
-Kelly A. Casper 
acquired responsibility for the pay-
ment of over $6.6 million in insurance 
claims. 
In June of 1989, HUD issued a 
limited denial of participation prohib-
iting petitioners from taking part in 
any program in South Carolina ad-
ministered by respondent, Assistant 
Secretary of Housing, for one year. 
During a hearing on the consolidated 
appeals, an Administrative Law Judge 
issued an "Initial Decision and Or-
der" and found good cause to debar 
petitioners for a period of eighteen 
months. 
Neither petitioner nor respondent 
sought further administrative review 
although they were entitled to request 
a review by the Secretary according 
to 24 C.F.R. § 24.314(c) (1992). 
Instead, petitioners filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the 
District of South Carolina seeking an 
injunction or declaration that the ad-
ministrative sanctions were imposed 
for purposes of punishment in viola-
tion ofHUD's own debarment regu-
lations. The respondents moved to 
dismiss the complaint on the grounds 
that petitioners failed to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies. The district 
court denied respondents' motion to 
dismiss reasoning that the adminis-
trative remedy was inadequate. In a 
su bsequent opinion, the court granted 
petitioners' motion for summary 
judgement. 
On appeal by the respondents, 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit reversed. Darby v. Kemp, 
957 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1992). The 
court concluded that there was no 
evidence to suggest that further re-
view would have been ineffective or 
that the Secretary would have abused 
his discretion by indetenninately ex-
tending the fifteen day time limitation 
for review. The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari after the Fourth 
Circuit denied petitioners' petition for 
rehearing. 
The Court began its review by 
analyzing the plain language of the 
APA,5 U.S.c. § 704. Section lO(c) 
provides that judicial review is avail-
able for final agency action when 
there is no other adequate remedy in a 
court, and that preliminary, proce-
dural, or intermediate agency ac-
tion ... is subject to review on the 
review of the final agency action 
. . .. Except as otherwise ex-
pressly required by statute, agency 
action otherwise final is final for 
the purposes of this section 
whether or not there has been pre-
sented or determined an applica-
tion for a declaratory order, for 
any form of reconsideration or, 
unless the agency otherwise requires 
by rule and provides that the action 
meanwhile is inoperative, for an ap-
peal to superior agency authority. 5 
V.S.c. §704. 
It was this text of the AP A itself 
that the Court used as the foundation 
for its opinion. The Court gave defer-
ence to Congress' power to establish 
the basic rules under which a claim 
may be heard in a federal court and to 
fashion those exhaustion principles in 
a manner compatible with congres-
sional intent. Cisneros, 113 S. Ct. at 
2543 (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 
112 S. Ct. 1081 (1992». Section 
I O( c) of the AP A codifies the doctrine 
of exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies. Under section 10(c), "[a] per-
son suffering legal wrong because of 
agency action, or adversely affected 
or aggrieved by agency action within 
the meaning of a relevant statue, is 
entitled to judicial review thereof." 
Jd. at 2544 (quoting 5 U.S.c. § 702). 
Section I O(c) then establishes the stan-
dards for the availability of review 
and limits the application of the doc-
trine of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies to that which the statute or 
rule clearly mandates. ld. at 2545. 
The Court concluded that it would be 
inconsistent to require the litigants to 
exhaust optional appeals when the 
plain language of section lO(c) ex-
plicitly requires exhaustion only when 
mandated by statutory or agency rule. 
Jd. 
Legislative history supports this 
position as well. In a letter written to 
the Judiciary Committee from Attor-
ney General Tom C. Clark, dated 
October 19, 1945, Clark maintained 
that section lO(c) was intended to set 
forthexistinglaw.ld. at4682. While 
the law at the time allowed federal 
courts to require exhaustion as a pre-
requisite to review, the Court noted 
that those cases preceded the enact-
ment of the APA. Jd. The pre-APA 
cases stated that until an administra-
tive appeal was taken, the agency 
action was unreviewable because it 
was not yet final. The decision was 
not final because at that time, admin-
istrative agencies did not authorize 
hearing officers to make final agency 
decisions prior to the enactment of the 
APA. ld. at 4683. 
The dicta in pre-AP A cases con-
cerning section I O( c) also reinforces 
the Court's holding. In Vandalia R. 
Co. v. Public Service Comm 'n, 242 
U.S. 255 (1916), the Court held that 
state law provided only that the Rail-
road Commission had the authority to 
grant a rehearing but did not require 
that rehearing be requested. ld. at 
4682. In another pre-AP A case the 
Court stated that it was not necessary 
for the defendant to apply to the Com-
mission for a rehearing before resort-
ing to the court because the law does 
not require such an application be 
made, and granting a rehearing is 
entirely within the discretion of the 
Commission. Therefore, there was 
no basis for making the application to 
the Commission a prerequisite to ju-
dicial review. ld. (citing Prendergast 
v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U.S. 
43 (1923». 
As a result of Darby v. Cisneros, 
the Supreme Court settled a conflict 
among the courts of appeals and de-
fined the boundaries of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act and the judi-
cially created doctrine of exhaustion. 
Darby v. Cisneros strengthens the 
AP A by forcing the courts to adhere 
to the plain language of section 1 O( c) 
rather than fonnulating contradictory 
policies. The decision, however, also 
allows any petitioner to ignore the 
convenient, efficient, and less costly 
administrative review process by seek-
ingj udicial review in ou r overcrowded 
judicial system. 
-Laura J. Mann 
